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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err by holding the defendant credit 
union liable for torts committed by the independent 
contractor towing company hired by the credit union? 
Did the trial court err by failing to allocate to the 
plaintiff the burden of proving that plaintiff1s vehicle 
was damaged while under the control of the defendant? 
Did the trial court err by allocating to the defendant the 
burden of proving "for sure" that neither it nor the 
independent contractor caused the damage? 
Did the trial court err by imposing a "for sure" standard 
of proof on the defendant to rebut a presumption of 
liability instead of a "preponderance of the evidence" 
standard? 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1985, plaintiff/respondent, Charley Killian, 
entered into a loan agreement with defendant, Salt Lake City 
Employees Credit Union, to purchase a 1966 Jaguar XKE-2d Road-
ster, VIN 1E12712, for which the Jaguar was pledged as colla-
teral. The promissory note included a provision whereby the 
vehicle could be repossessed by the credit union in the event Mr. 
Killian defaulted on the loan. Mr. Killian defaulted on the note 
by failing to make payments due in January, February and March of 
1986. 
The credit union provided notice to Mr. Killian of its 
intent to repossess the vehicle. On April 8, 1986, the credit 
union hired a towing company as an independent contractor and 
authorized it to repossess and transport the vehicle to the 
credit union for storage, pursuant to its normal repossession 
procedure. The vehicle was repossessed on either April 12 or 13, 
1986. 
Mr. Killian subsequently paid the loan balance in full and 
took possession of the Jaguar on or about April 17, 1986. 
Mr. Killian brought this action to recover costs incurred in 
repairing the vehicle, which he charged was damaged by the credit 
union or the towing company while the vehicle was under their 
control. 
This action was tried before a circuit court which returned 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff/respondent. 
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SUMMARY OF, ARGUMENT 
Defendant hired an independent contractor to repossess 
plaintiff's vehicle. As a matter of law, defendant is not liable 
for the torts of its independent contractor and is, therefore, 
not liable for any damage to the vehicle occurring while in the 
possession or control of the independent contractor. 
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that the damage 
to his vehicle occurred while in the exclusive control of the 
defendant. This lack of evidence precluded a presumption against 
defendant from arising. Therefore, the burden of proof did not 
shift to defendant and defendant had no duty to rebut the 
presumption. 
Even if the presumption had arisen, defendant need only 
prove that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable 
than its existence. This burden is quite simple to meet since 
the vehicle was more likely to be damaged during transport by the 
independent contractor than during storage by the defendant. 
Since the defendant is not liable for the torts of the 
independent towing company and the trial court erred in shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant, given the evidence,' defen-
dant is entitled, as a matter of law, to have the judgment of the 
trial court reversed and a judgment entered in its favor. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HIRED THE TOWING COMPANY AS AN IN-
DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND WAS NOT AN EMPLOYER. 
The defendant has no contract or other permanent relation-
ship with th<e towing company which picked up plaintiff!s vehicle. 
Defendant uses numerous towing companies and contracts with them 
only on a single transaction basis. Defendant merely authorizes 
the towing company to repossess the vehicle and deliver it to 
defendant's premises. It has no control over the means or me-
thods by which the towing company accomplishes the repossession. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE TORTS OF THE 
TOWING COMPANY WHICH REPOSSESSED THE VEHICLE 
FROM PLAINTIFF. 
It is well settled law that the employer of an independent 
contractor is immune from liability for the torts of the contrac-
tor. 57 C.J.S., Master & Servant, §§580-610 (1950); Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 4-09* The exceptions to this general rule arise 
where the employer has a non-delegable duty, does not use care in 
selection of the independent contractor, hires the contractor to 
conduct an inherently dangerous activity or in other similar 
circumstances. Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 635 
P.2d 426 (Wash. 1981). 
The Utah case law is supportive of this position. In 
k 
Dowsett v, Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949), the 
Utah Supreme Court accepted the rule that "a principal cannot be 
held responsible for the torts of his agent where he has no right 
of control over that agent." 
In Currie v. Sechrist, $81 P.2d 700 (Ariz.App. 1978) the 
independent contractor status of an automobile towing company was 
sufficient to protect the hiring shopping center from liability 
for the towing company's tortious conduct. 
In another Arizona case, two banks were defending an action 
based on a tort committed by an independent auto recovery ser-
vice. The Arizona Appeals Court stated that the banks would not 
be responsible for the torts of the independent contractor unless 
one of the special exceptions applied. Addressing whether the 
auto repossession business was inherently dangerous such that 
liability of the independent contractor should be assessed 
against the principals, the court held that the act repossessing 
an automobile did not involve "a special danger to others so as 
to bring into play the exception to the non-liability rule of a 
principal for the acts of an independent contractor." Bible v. 
First National Bank of Rawlins, 515 P.2d 351, 355 (Ariz.App. 
1973), rehearing denied, review denied. 
The defendant aredit union used an independent towing com-
pany to repossess plaintiff's vehicle. Since there is no special 
exception to the general rule of non-liability which affects this 
relationship, the defendant is not liaTil^  for any damage which 
may have occurred to plaintiff's vehicle while in possession of 
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the towing company. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE 
VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED WHILE IN THE POSSESSION OF 
THE DEFENDANT AND NO PRESUMPTION AROSE SHIFTING 
THAT BURDEN TO DEFENDANT. 
The general rule is that the bailor "must show that an 
injury to his [property]. . . occurred after delivery of the 
property to the bailee, and while it was in the bailee's posses-
sion." 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 50 (1950); 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles 
§ 727 (1950). The bailor has to meet this burden of proof before 
a presumption may be made that the bailee was negligent in caus-
ing the damage. Id. 
This is also the Utah rule. The presumption of a bailee's 
liability arises only after proof that the property was destroyed 
during bailment. Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533 
P.2d 900 (Utah 1975). 
In Staheli v. Farmers' Co-op. of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 
(Utah 1982), the court examined the preumption which arises 
against a bailee when the bailee proves the existence of a 
bailment and damage to the property: 
The policy that sustains the presumption arises from the 
practical consideration that one who is in possession of 
another!s property is in a better position to control the 
conditions that may cause loss or damage and to know, or at 
l^east to be able to ascertain, the cause of any actual loss 
or damage. A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is 
that the bailee be in exclusive possession, and it is that 
proposition that gives logical force to the presumption. 
Id. at 683, emphasis added. The Staheli court held that where 
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the property was not shown to have been damaged while in the 
exclusive control of the bailor, the presumption did not arise. 
In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to show that 
the damage to his vehicle occurred while in the exclusive control 
of the defendant credit union. Without such proof, it is as 
probable that the damage occurred while the vehicle was in the 
possession and under the control of the towing company, over 
which defendant exercised no control. 
Because plaintiff has failed to prove that the damage occur-
red while in the possession and exclusive control of defendant, 
no presumption arose to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant. The trial court, therefore, erred in failing to 
allocate the necessary burden of proof to the plaintiff. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO 
PROVE "FOR SURE" THAT NEITHER IT NOR ITS 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE 
VEHICLE. 
As discussed above, the defendant is not liable for the 
torts of the independent towing company. If the damage to the 
vehicle occurred while it was in the possession of the towing 
company, plaintiff's proper action is against the towing company. 
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the damage 
occurred while the vehicle was under the control of either the 
towing company or the credit union. Even assuming arguendo that 
such evidence had been produced, the burden of proof still would 
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not shift to defendant unless plaintiff showed the damage to have 
occurred while in the exclusive control of defendant. Staheli 
supra. 
The burden of proof lies with plaintiff to show that the 
damage occurred while in possession of the bailors,- and more 
specifically, while in the exclusive possession of defendant. 
Only then does the burden of persuasion shift to defendant. The 
trial court, therefore, erred in allocating to the defendant the 
burden of proving "for sure" that neither it nor the independent 
contractor caused the damage. 
POINT V 
EVEN IF THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION HAD FALLEN 
TO DEFENDANT, THE PROPER STANDARD OF PROOF 
IS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RATHER THAN 
A "FOR SURE" STANDARD. 
Even in cases where the plaintiff has successfully shifted 
the burden of proof.to the defendant bailee, the presumption of 
fault is rebuttable. The Utah Rules of Evidence clearly state 
that Jla presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden .of proving that the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact is more probable than its existence." Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 301. 
Even if the plaintiff had introduced evidence to give rise 
to a presumption and shift the burden of* proof to the defendant, 
the defendant need only produce a preponderance of evidence to 
rebut the presumption. It does not need to prove "for sure" that 
8 
neither it nor its independent contractor caused the damage to 
plaintiff's vehicle. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
imposing a "for sure" standard of proof upon the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, defendant is not liable for the torts of 
its independent contractor. The trial court also erred in 
shifting to defendant the burden of proof. As a result, 
defendant is entitled to and seeks reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new 
trial. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 1987. 
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Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
CHARLEY KIT.LIAH Plaintiff 
VS. 
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEES Defendant 
CREDIT UNION 
Thi» matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavit of plaiffflff, and the defendant has been 
served with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defendant, and return of service has been made. The 
following parties appeared at the hearing: 
O Plaintiff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set, and the defendant's default has been 
entered. 
50 Both plaintiff and defendant appeared and presented evidence. 
. Principal 
.Court costs, and 
$ lal (>*3l TrtTAi JUDGMENT r i r V - ' ^ X 
• *&:.**"<. •' s't» 
DATEO 1-20
 1Q 87 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at He&ijno.;\-j\;\\\fr 
Clerk 
TO THE DEFENDANT ONLY: 
If the above judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in 
the Circuit Court in the amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied with this judgment, you have only 
FIVE (5) DAYS from receipt of this notice to appeal the case to the District Court 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ONLY: 
You should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five 
days from receipt of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the 
original of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action. 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above 
named defendants) 6t$) PlAIffl"!FF fPf AfNTTFF) ?BQ1 SttfTH liJRMA.PyiVE, SIX. liTAH M120 
(LLfovm) Jbu) SOUTH MAIN STRECT, SALT U«dcm?*Jfefc #015 
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